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Abstract	
This	article	constitutes	an	examination	on	how	citizen	journalism	has	challenged	Robert	
Mugabe’s	authoritarian	regime	on	issues	pertaining	to	national	heroes	and	usages	of	the	
Heroes	Acre	as	central	national	identity	markers.	Under	Mugabe’s	ZANU‐PF,	Zimbabwe	
has	seen	the	public	being	limited	from	directly	participating	in	salient	national	debates.	
ZANU‐PF’s	 control	 of	 the	official	 public	 sphere	has	 also	 constrained	 alternative	 views	
from	ventilating	the	government‐controlled	communicative	spaces.	The	party’s	narrative	
on	heroes,	the	Heroes	Acre	and	national	identity	has	gained	a	taken‐for‐granted	status	in	
the	public	media.	This	has	obtained	against	the	backdrop	of	what	has	become	known	as	
the	Zimbabwe	crises,	characterised	by	a	declining	economy,	a	constricted	political	space,	
a	breakdown	in	the	rule	of	law,	and	the	subsequent	flight	of	a	number	of	Zimbabweans	
into	 the	 diaspora.	 The	 accompanying	 wave	 of	 technological	 advancements	 and	 the	
mushrooming	 of	 mostly	 diaspora‐based	 online	 media	 have	 opened	 up	 new	 vistas	 of	
communication,	 enabling	 a	 hitherto	 ‘silenced’	 community	 of	 ordinary	 people	 to	
participate	 in	 national	 conversations.	 The	 conclusion	 reached	 here,	 is	 that	 citizen	
journalism	has	not	only	enhanced	the	culture	of	conversation	among	people	(as	espoused	
under	democratic	conditions)	but	has	also	covered	up	the	democratic	deficit	experienced	
in	the	public	sphere,	mediated	by	traditional	media,	parliament	and	pavement	radio.	
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INTRODUCTION	
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Since	 the	 Zimbabwe	 ‘crisis’1	 (Masunungure	 2006;	 Mlambo	 and	 Raftopoulos	 2010;	
Muzondidya	 2009;	 Ndlovu‐Gatsheni	 2009;	 Raftopoulos	 2006)	 in	 the	 early	 2000s	 the	
Zimbabwe	 Heroes’	 Acre,	 and	 the	 selection	 and	 burial	 of	 heroes	 have	 become	 potent,	
controversial	and	contested	terrains	in	Zimbabwe’s	contentious	nation‐making	project.	
Besides	myths,	monuments	such	as	heroes’	acres	and	national	heroes	are	amongst	the	
most	 important	 nation‐making	 symbols	 to	 have	 featured	 in	 the	 Zimbabwe	 African	
National	 Union‐Patriotic	 Front’s	 (ZANU‐PF)	 post‐colonial	 national	 bonding	 narrative,	
particularly	 post‐2000.	 Successive	 ZANU‐PF	 governments	 have	 controlled	 national	
identity	narratives	in	the	public	media	since	1980.	The	year	2000	marked	a	dip	in	ZANU‐
PFs’	 popularity	 in	 Zimbabwe,	 characterised	 by	 declining	 support;	 the	 formation	 of	 a	
formidable	 opposition	 party	 (the	 Movement	 for	 Democratic	 Change	 [MDC]	 that	
performed	better	than	expected	in	the	parliamentary	elections	of	that	year,	disrupting	
ZANU‐PF’s	hegemony	for	 the	 first	 time	since	 the	1987	Unity	Accord	[Mpofu	2014a];	a	
slump	 in	 the	economy;	 rising	unemployment	 levels	and	dwindling	opportunities	 for	a	
better	life.	These	factors	were	compounded	by	the	exodus	of	a	considerable	number	of	
(especially)	skilled	and	educated	Zimbabweans	into	the	diaspora.	With	passing	time	and	
ZANU‐PF’s	 dictatorial	 tendencies	 wearing	 off	 its	 liberation	 war‐inspired	 legitimacy,	
ZANU‐PF	has	used	the	Heroes’	Acre	and	dead	heroes	to	‘re‐freeze’	its	ideologies,	both	in	
space	and	time	(Osborne	1998)	so	as	to	preserve	this	 legitimacy.	Among	other	things,	
ZANU‐PF	utilises	cultural	forms	of	nationalism	which	include	celebrating	heroes	through	
music	 galas	 (Ndlovu‐Gatsheni	 and	 Willems	 2009;	 Willems	 2013),	 documentaries	 or	
feature	articles	in	state‐controlled	media,	patriotic	history	(Ranger	2004)	and	national	
holiday	celebrations	(Mpofu	2015;	Willems	2013).		
In	a	context	where	the	ruling	party	and	government	of	the	day	are	conflated,	the	
Heroes’	Acre	has	been	used	as	an	exclusively	ZANU‐PF	 inner	members’	private	burial	
shrine,	 rendering	 it	 a	 contaminated	 space	 and	 site	 of	 national	 identity	 conflict	 and	
contest.	Osborne	(2001,	n.p.)	argues	that	in	such	a	case	national	mythologies,	symbols	
and	shrines	‘are	manipulated	to	encourage	identification	with	the	state	and	reinforce	its	
continuity	and	ubiquity’.	 Shrines	 (especially	 in	postcolonial	 settings)	are	 important	as	
they	 freeze	 the	 past	 which	 becomes	 meaningful	 and	 activated	 ‘by	 the	 contemporary	
                                                 
1 Elsewhere (Mpofu 2014a) the argument is made that the Zimbabwe crisis is multilayered, complex and cannot 
be said to have begun in the early 2000s. Zimbabwe has always gone through moments of crisis, the major instance 
perhaps being the 1963 break-up of the nationalist movement. 
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desires	of	individuals	and	communities,	and,	most	powerfully,	by	the	will	of	the	nations’	
(Osborne	2004,	 xvii).	 They	 act	 as	 spaces	 for	 ceremonies,	mourning	 and	 therapy,	 thus	
seemingly	harmonising	and	forming	an	association	with	certain	ideologies	(Kalipeni	and	
Zeleza	 1999).	 The	 Heroes’	 Acre	 is	 meant	 to	 symbolise	 the	 painful	 route	 followed	 in	
birthing	the	Zimbabwean	nation.	It	also	stands	as	a	reminder	of	where	the	nation	is	going,	
in	so	far	as	the	decolonisation	project	is	concerned.	However,	as	this	article	demonstrates,	
the	shrine	stands	corrupted,	contested	and	condemned.	
This	 article	 suggests	 that	Web	 2.0	 has	 created	 an	 architecture	 of	 participation	
(O’Reilly	 2005).	 Here,	 we	 examine	 how	 citizen	 journalism	 challenges	 Zimbabwe’s	
authoritarian	regime	on	issues	pertaining	to	national	hero	selection	and	the	usages	of	the	
Heroes’	Acre	as	a	central	national	identity	marker	from	2000–2015.	This	period	is	key	in	
Zimbabwean	politics,	 as	 the	 ‘crisis’	 in	 the	 country	had	 global	 relevance.	 ZANU‐PF	has	
advanced	 a	 hitherto	 dominant	 narrative	 on	 heroes,	 the	 Heroes’	 Acre	 and	 national	
identity,	and	these	discourses	have	gained	currency,	domination	and	taken‐for‐granted	
status	over	time	–	especially	in	the	public	media.	Since	the	signing	of	the	Unity	Accord	in	
1987,	burials	and	the	Heroes’	Acre	were	not	as	 intensely	contested	as	 is	currently	the	
case.	This	can	largely	be	attributed	to	the	deregulation	of	the	economy	(and	the	media	
space)	 in	 the	 1990s,	 and	 the	 advent	 of	 new	 media	 technologies	 as	 alternative	
communicative	fora	for	the	ostracised	and	excluded	majority.		
	
THE	CASE,	METHOD	AND	FOCUS	
	
The	wave	of	technology	that	swept	through	the	country’s	communicative	space	from	the	
2000s	has	altered	ZANU‐PF’s	dominance	on	salient	national	debates.	This	study	relies	on	
a	diasporic	 online	 news	 site	 and	 citizen	 journalism	 to	 analyse	 the	 ordinary	 everyday	
citizens’	attitudes	and	opinions	on	government’s	 treatment	of	debates	on	Zimbabwe’s	
national	heroes	and	its	Heroes’	Acre.	For	the	purposes	of	this	research,	only	the	stories	
and	 citizen	 journalism	 activities	 from	 a	 case	 study	 –	 are	 used,	 namely	 the	 online	 site	
Newzimbabwe.com.	This	does	not	in	any	way	suggest	that	it	is	the	only	site	available	to	
Zimbabweans,	but	suffice	to	say	that	this	is	one	of	the	leading	online	news	platforms	in	
Zimbabwe.	 It	 is	 probably	 the	oldest	 and	was	 the	 first	 to	 introduce	 citizen	 journalism,	
allowing	 users	 to	 debate	 issues	 without	 much	 gatekeeping.	 In	 addition,	 users	 could	
contribute	to	certain	stories.	Therefore,	studying	this	website	(which	was	soon	emulated	
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post‐2003)	 provides	 some	 insight	 into	 how	 citizens	 appropriate	 new	media	 as	 tools	
which	enable	them	to	confront	the	status	quo.	Newzimbabwe.com	is	owned	by	a	Wales‐
based	 company,	 New	 Zimbabwe	 Limited.	 The	 current	 editor	 of	 the	 government‐
controlled	Chronicle	newspaper,	Mduduzi	Mathuthu,	who	previously	compiled	the	letters	
to	the	editor	in	this	newspaper	and	worked	as	a	journalist	at	Daily	News,	is	the	founding	
editor	of	Newzimbabwe.com.	Mathuthu	sold	his	shares	to	Jeff	Madzingo	in	2013	before	
joining	 The	 Chronicle.	 In	 company	 describes	 itself	 as	 follows:	 ‘We	 boast	 the	 finest	
correspondents	and	columnists	you	can	assemble	in	Zimbabwe	and	abroad.	The	constant	
flow	of	brilliantly	presented	ideas	and	strong	argument	has	brought	us	plaudits,	while	
those	who	 hate	 our	 cause	 inevitably	 frown	 upon	 us’	 (Newzimbabwe.com	 2003).	 The	
news	site	is	funded	through	advertising	and	boasts	professional	layouts,	with	categories	
such	as:	‘News,	Business,	Showbiz,	Sports,	Opinion,	Local,	Diaspora,	Religion	and	Blogs’	
(ibid.)	–	all	of	which	allow	space	for	citizen	engagement.		
The	main	agenda	of	this	article	is	to	analyse	how	citizen	journalism	has	‘liberated’	
the	 discourse	 of	 nation‐formation	 from	 ZANU‐PF	 control,	 while	 affording	 ordinary	
Zimbabweans	 an	 opportunity	 to	 exercise	 agency	 by	 giving	 them	 a	 voice	 on	 national	
debates.	To	do	this,	of	course	the	dominant	narratives	of	ZANU‐PF	and	the	public	media	
on	 issues	 related	 to	 the	Heroes’	Acre	 and	national	 heroes	 need	 to	 be	 intimated,	 even	
though	this	constitutes	a	separate	study	altogether.	Citizen	journalism,	according	to	Luke	
Goode	(2009:	1289)	refers	to	‘a	range	of	web‐based	practices	whereby	“ordinary”	users	
engage	in	journalistic	practices	…	such	as	current	affairs	based	blogging,	photo	and	video	
sharing,	 and	 posting	 eyewitness	 commentary	 on	 current	 events’	 and	 commenting	 on	
stories.	 Methodologically,	 this	 researcher	 used	 the	 website’s	 search	 bars	 to	 enter	
keywords	 like	 ‘Heroes’	 Acre’,	 ‘heroes’	 and	 ‘heroes’	 burial’.	 Stories	 related	 to	 these	
keywords	were	conveniently	selected	and	read.	Next,	stories	and	comments	considered	
useful	 for	 this	 article,	were	 subjectively	 selected.	 The	 selected	 postings	 largely	 railed	
against	the	status	quo.	As	a	result,	the	study	grapples	with	the	following	questions:	What	
are	 the	 meanings	 of	 ZANU‐PF’s	 constructions	 and	 imaginations	 of	 the	 Heroes’	 Acre,	
heroes	and	national	identity,	and	how	are	these	received	by	online	audiences?	How	have	
new	 media	 technologies	 altered	 the	 way	 people	 engage	 on	 national	 identity,	 with	 a	
special	focus	on	heroes	and	the	Heroes’	Acre?			
To	answer	these	questions,	this	study	employs	critical	discourse	analysis	(CDA)	to	
engage	with	citizen	journalists’	debates	in	an	in‐depth	fashion.	CDA	is	used	to	study	‘the	
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way	social	power	abuse,	dominance,	and	inequality	are	enacted,	reproduced,	and	resisted	
by	text	and	talk	in	the	social	and	political	context’	(Van	Dijk	2001,	352).	The	role	of	CDA	
is	therefore	to	‘take	explicit	position,	and	thus	want	to	understand,	expose,	and	ultimately	
resist	 social	 inequality’	 (ibid.).	 This	 research	 takes	 the	 position	 that	 ZANU‐PF	 has	
narrowed	down	and	even	excluded	the	citizenry	from	participating	in	national	debates,	
which	 has	 led	 to	 online	media	 debates	 railing	 against	 the	 ruling	 party.	 This	 research	
concludes	that	citizen	journalism	has	given	ordinary	people	a	platform	to	challenge	the	
dominant	narratives	of	autocratic	regimes	via	secure	and	safe	online	avenues.	Further,	
citizen	journalism	has	not	only	enhanced	the	culture	of	conversation	among	people,	as	
espoused	under	democratic	theory	(Carpentier	and	Dahlgren	2013;	Mouffe	2000),	but	
has	also	covered	up	the	democratic	deficit	experienced	in	authoritarian	countries.	This	
research	occupies	a	special	place	in	the	growing	Zimbabwean	literature	on	monuments	
and	identity	(Fisher	2010;	Mpofu	2014a;	2016);	cultural	nation‐making	processes	using	
national	monuments,	holidays	and	heroes	(Kriger	1995;	Mpofu	2015b;	Ndlovu‐Gatsheni	
and	Willems	2009;	Willems	2013)	and	the	role	of	new	media	in	affording	ordinary	people	
a	voice	and	creating	alternative	platforms	for	discourse	on	national	identity	issues	(Mano	
and	Willems	2008;	L.	Moyo	2009;	Mpofu	2014a;	Peel	2009).	
	
CITIZEN	JOURNALISM	AS	ALTERNATIVE	PUBLIC	SPHERE	
	
Part	 of	 Mugabe’s	 totalitarian	 legacy	 in	 post‐2000	 Zimbabwe	 is	 the	 contributions	 he	
inadvertently	made	to	the	growth	of	new	media	–	especially	online	news	sites.	Thus,	as	
the	 socio‐political	 and	 economic	 chaos	 which	 ZANU‐PF	 has	 ushered	 Zimbabwe	 into	
gained	momentum	in	the	2000s,	a	large	number	of	people	fled	the	country	as	political	
and	 economic	 refugees.	 Among	 these	 were	 journalists	 and	 activists	 who	 started	 and	
participated	in	online	publications	and	debates	from	the	diaspora	(e.g.,	in	2000	alone	the	
intolerant	ZANU‐PF	government	arrested	20	local	journalists	and	deported	three	foreign	
correspondents	from	the	country).	These	media	are	also	accessible	in	the	homeland,	even	
though	 there	 are	 challenges	 related	 to	 affordability	 of	 software	 and	 hardware,	
technological	 know‐how	 and	 connectivity	 in	 a	 highly	 informalised	 economy	 like	
Zimbabwe.	Diasporic	online	media,	together	with	what	Ellis	(1989)	calls	‘radio	trottoir’	
[pavement	radio],	continue	to	challenge	government‐sponsored	dominant	discourses	in	
the	local	official	media.	In	the	process,	this	ventilates	the	public	sphere	with	alternative	
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or	yet	to	be	officially	confirmed/denied	information.	Diaspora,	in	this	article,	is	used	in	
accordance	with	the	definitions	proffered	by	Walter	Connor	(1994),	Judith	Shuval	(2000),	
William	Safran	(1991)	and	Martin	Baumann	(2000),	to	refer	to	a	segment	of	people	living	
outside	their	homeland	(Zimbabwe	in	this	case)	while	maintaining	interests	in	it	from	
their	new	homes	(bases)	in	the	diaspora.	Shuval	(2000,	41)	clarifies	that	the	diaspora	live	
and	act	 in	 ‘host	 countries	but	maintaining	 strong	 sentimental	 and	material	 links	with	
their	 countries	 of	 origin	 –	 their	 homelands’.	 The	 Zimbabwean	 diaspora’s	 definition	
(because	of	the	way	some	of	them	left	the	homeland)	has	‘emotion‐laden	connotations	of	
uprootedness,	 precariousness	 and	 homesickness	 provid[ing]	 explanations	 for	 the	
group’s	enduring	and	nostalgic	loyalty	to	…	the	country	of	origin’	(ibid,	314).	
While	journalism	has	hitherto	been	viewed	as	a	lecture,	online	news	media	have	
upset	 this	 ‘status	 quo’	 and	 introduced	 citizen	 journalism,	 which	 has	 shown	 that	
journalism	can	be	a	conversation	as	well	where	audiences	interact	both	with	journalists	
and	amongst	themselves	(Marchionni	2013;	Mpofu	2014a	and	b).	The	diasporic	online	
media	have	entered	into	a	polarised	mediascape	as	alternative	media	(Atton	2002;	Bailey,	
Cammaerts	 and	 Carpentier	 2008;	 Mpofu	 2014a	 and	 b)	 to	 the	 public	 media,	 whose	
political	economy	means	they	have	to	support	ZANU‐PF.	This	expansion	has	enriched	the	
constrained	 Zimbabwean	 public	 sphere.	 According	 to	 Atton	 (2002)	 and	 Bailey	 et	 al.	
(2008),	alternative	media	are	organised	and	operate	differently	from	mainstream	media,	
especially	where	financing,	the	distribution	of	media	products	and	the	management	of	
organisations	and	their	relationship	with	the	status	quo	are	concerned.	Alternative	media	
are	 usually	 conceptualised	 as	 playing	 a	 counter‐hegemonic	 role	 in	 society,	 in	 railing	
against	 the	 dominant	 discourses	 advanced	 by	 the	 ruling	 elite.	 This	 function	 bears	 a	
semblance	to	‘letters	to	the	editor’	in	traditional	media.	Citizen	journalism	has	given	life,	
agency	and	character	to	those	audiences	that	previously	existed	in	traditional	journalists’	
imagination.		
The	contributions	of	diasporic	online	media	to	the	Zimbabwean	public	sphere	are	
simple	 to	 account,	 yet	 profound.	 Those	 members	 in	 the	 news	 consumption	 chain	
(previously	called	‘consumers’)	are	now	both	consumers	and	producers,	as	online	media	
allow	them	to	gather,	process	and	distribute	material	by	writing	blogs	attached	to	news	
sites,	 posting	 videos	 and	 photographs,	 or	 commenting	 under	 ‘stories’.	 Another	
revolutionary	 characteristic	 of	 online	 media	 is	 the	 empowerment	 of	 dispossessed,	
ostracised	and	excluded	citizens	by	giving	them	a	voice	(Mitra	2001,	2004)	which	allows	
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them	to	challenge	those	in	power.	This	becomes	a	unique	forum	for	expression	that	is	not	
accessible	 in	 the	 print	 and	 broadcast	 media	 controlled	 by	 ZANU‐PF	 in	 Zimbabwe.	
Recently,	almost	all	Zimbabwean	newspapers	–	private	and	public	–	went	online,	making	
provision	 for	reader	commentary	on	stories.	However,	comments	 that	 rail	against	 the	
status	quo	do	not	make	it	into	the	hard	copy	newspapers	that	are	sold	on	the	streets	and	
supermarkets,	since	only	a	limited	number	of	positive	comments	and	SMSs	are	chosen.	
The	use	of	diasporic	online	media	is	informed	by	an	established	trend	of	most	of	these	
media	being	anti‐status	quo,	operating	outside	 local	media	 laws	and	relying	on	online	
advertising/funding	 from	 their	 founders	 –	 a	 political	 economy	 vastly	 different	 from	
publicly	 owned	 media.	 Reader	 participation	 or	 citizen	 journalism	 gives	 some	 stories	
credibility,	especially	when	confirmed	by	citizens	who	are	 in	proximity	to	an	event	or	
experienced	 it	 first‐hand	 (Gulyas	 2013).	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 official	 communication	 –	
especially	during	 election	 time	 –	 citizen	 journalists	 ‘trade’	 in	 and	with	 information	 in	
parallel	communicative	spaces	(see	Moyo’s	[2009]	study	of	Zimbabwe’s	2008	elections).	
While	 scholars	 like	Pavlic	 (2000)	 suggest	 that	 citizen	 journalism	has	 created	 a	
two‐way	street	of	communication	between	journalists	and	the	public,	evidence	from	my	
research	in	Zimbabwe	points	to	the	fact	that	journalists,	after	publishing	stories	online,	
remain	 silent	 and	 allow	 readers	 to	 debate.	 This	 does	 not,	 however,	 suggest	 that	
journalists	do	not	read	the	comments:	in	some	cases,	readers	point	out	inaccuracies	in	
stories,	which	are	later	corrected	by	the	journalists.	Tied	to	this	notion	is	the	fact	that	
citizen	journalists	can	now	monitor	traditional	media	and	journalists,	thus	assuming	the	
role	 of	 the	 Fifth	 Estate	 by	watching	 over	 the	watchdogs	 (Mabweazara	 2014;	Milioni,	
Konstantinos	and	Venetia	2012).	
Moreover,	scholars	such	as	McElroy	(cited	in	Mabweazara	2014)	‘raise	concerns’	
about	the	authenticity	of	online	material	written	under	pseudonyms.	It	is	important	to	
point	 out	 that	 in	 countries	 where	 state	 security	 agents	 monitor	 people’s	 private	
communications,	 it	 is	 imperative	that	citizen	 journalists	be	cautious	and	not	risk	their	
own	 security	 or	 that	 of	 their	 families.	 Besides	 the	 negative	 aspects	 of	 participatory	
journalism	(e.g.,	an	avalanche	of	uncontrolled	comments	or	flaming	[lack	of	civility	and	
use	 of	 vulgar	 language]),	 new	 media	 have	 revolutionised	 and	 expanded	 the	 options	
citizens	have	to	subvert	and	undermine	authoritarian	regimes	through	discourse	(Bernal	
2004,	2005;	Mano	and	Willems	2008;	Mpofu	2014a,	2015a;	Parham	2004).		
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The	practice	of	citizen	journalism	is	not	without	challenges,	especially	for	citizen	
journalists	inside	Zimbabwe.	With	the	economy	performing	poorly	and	most	employed	
people	having	been	 reduced	 to	vending	 second‐hand	 clothing,	 fruit	 and	vegetables	or	
telephone	 recharge	 card,	 bread‐and‐butter	 issues	 tend	 to	 be	 more	 important	 than	
informational	 needs.	While	 citizen	 journalism	 has	 dismantled	 gatekeeping	 and	 other	
ethics‐enhancing	 codes	 used	 by	 traditional	 media	 to	 protect	 audiences,	 this	 has	 left	
audiences	exposed	to	unethical	journalistic	practices	which	infringe	on	people’s	security	
and	privacy.	Be	that	as	it	may,	this	article	will	demonstrate	how	citizen	journalism	has	
been	instrumental	in	contesting	ZANU‐PF’s	dominant	ideologies	and	affording	ordinary	
people	an	opportunity	to	discursively	construct	alternative	meanings	of,	amongst	others,	
the	Heroes’	 Acre,	 heroes	 and	 national	 identity.	 The	 internet	 as	 a	 safe	 and	 alternative	
platform	allows	for	expressions	that	would	not	usually	see	the	light	of	day,	particularly	
not	in	the	public	media.a	
	
The	Heroes’	Acre	and	definitions	of	heroes		
The	Ministry	of	Information	(1989,	3)	imagines	a	shrine	as	a	place	of	pilgrimage	for	the	
masses	intent	on	creating	their	own	history,	designed	to	‘arouse	national	consciousness,	
forge	national	unity	and	 identity	…	 the	pride	of	 the	people	of	Zimbabwe.	A	symbol	of	
bravery	and	selflessness	of	those	whose	remains	are	laid	to	rest	there.’	On	its	website,	the	
Zimbabwe	Tourism	Authority	(n.d.)	advertises	and	describes	the	Heroes’	Acre	thus:		
	
...	 a	 burial	 ground	 and	 national	 monument	 …	 Its	 stated	 purpose	 is	 to	 commemorate	
Patriotic	 Front	 guerrillas	 killed	 during	 the	 Rhodesian	 Bush	 War,	 and	 contemporary	
Zimbabweans	whose	dedication	or	commitment	to	their	country	justify	their	interment	
at	the	shrine.		
	 	
These	two	definitions	limit	themselves	to	the	liberation	war,	but	bring	out	an	important	
aspect	of	nationhood,	dedication	and	sacrifice,	and	attempt	to	legitimate	a	certain	group’s	
contribution	 to	 (and,	 to	a	 certain	extent,	dominance	of)	 the	nation.	For	Savage	 (1994,	
130),	monuments	and	the	commemoration	of	the	war	dead	anchor	and	legitimate	 ‘the	
very	notion	of	collective	memory’	as	key	to	national	identity	formation.	In	Zimbabwe,	this	
is	at	the	expense	of	gender,	democracy,	diversity	and	inclusivity.	
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The	 Heroes’	 Acre	 hosts	 the	 remains	 of	 undistinguished	 guerillas	 who	 only	
participated	 in	 the	 violent	 Third	 Chimurenga,	 people	 such	 as	 Cain	 Nkala,	 Chenjerai	
Hunzvi	 and	 Border	 Gezi,	 ZANU‐PF	members	 and	Mugabe	 loyalists	 with	 questionable	
liberation‐war	credentials.	This	makes	ZANU‐PF’s	criteria	for	national	hero	conferment	
as	peculiar	as	it	is	controversial.	Clearly,	the	principles	according	to	which	someone	may	
be	declared	a	national	hero	are	not	those	that	the	war	of	independence	was	fought	for.	
Practising	the	right	to	belong	or	form	a	political	party	alternative	to	ZANU‐PF	nullifies	an	
individual’s	status	as	a	national	hero,	along	with	his/her	contribution	to	the	country’s	
nationhood.	When	Mugabe’s	cousin	James	Chikerema	(one	of	the	founding	fathers	of	the	
country’s	 liberation	 struggle)	 died,	 Mugabe	 insisted	 on	 burying	 him	 ‘KwaZvimba’	 (in	
Mugabe’s	rural	home),	as	Chikerema	had	‘betrayed	his	comrades	when	he	joined	up	with	
Bishop	Abel	Muzorewa	and	Ian	Smith	as	part	of	the	internal	settlement	...	[and	ignoring	
party	policy	of]	consistency	and	persistence...	[which	are]	key	to	our	definition	of	national	
hero’	(Newzimbabwe.com,	September	18,	2010).	
In	 addition,	 when	 Thenjiwe	 Lesabe	 (a	 PF‐ZAPU	 founding	member	 and	 later	 a	
minister	and	member	of	ZANU‐PF	post	the	1987	Unity	Accord)	died	in	2011,	she	was	also	
denied	national	heroine	status.	The	Unity	Accord	was	a	compromise	peace	deal	meant	to	
end	further	bloodshed	through	a	genocide	in	Zimbabwe’s	south‐western	regions,	where	
20	 000	 Ndebele‐speaking	 people,	 perceived	 to	 be	 PF‐ZAPU	 supporters,	 were	 killed	
(Mpofu	2015b).	Lesabe	had	the	credentials	of	a	national	heroine,	having	 fought	 in	 the	
country’s	liberation	war	and	later	served	as	a	minister.	According	to	Amos	Ngwenya,	in	
an	opinion	article	 in	Newzimbabwe.com	(February	14,	2011),	Lesabe’s	crime	was	that	
she	 ‘decided	 to	 go	 back	 to	 her	 roots	 to	 re‐join	 the	 revived	 ZAPU	 and	 was	 elected	
chairperson	of	the	ZAPU	Council	of	Elders	at	the	party’s	9th	congress	held	in	Bulawayo	in	
2010’.	
According	to	ZANU‐PF’s	then	Secretary	for	Administration,	Didymus	Mutasa,	this	
act	obliterated	Lesabe’s	chances	of	being	conferred	heroine	status.	Mutasa	is	quoted	by	
Sithole	in	an	opinion	article	in	Newzimbabwe.com	as	saying:		
	
We	 could	 not	 confer	 to	 her	 a	 national	 heroine	 status,	 which	 was	 her	 rightful	 status,	
because	 she	 was	 not	 consistent	 when	 she	 joined	 ZAPU	 led	 by	 Dabengwa.	 …	 ZAPU	
members	are	still	part	and	parcel	of	ZANU‐PF	because	of	the	agreement	that	we	signed	
and	nobody	should	go	against	that	agreement.	(Sithole,	15	February	2011)	
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However,	this	did	not	apply	to	Edgar	Tekere,	who	was	declared	a	national	hero	despite	
his	friction	with	Mugabe.	His	history	is	captured	thus:			
	
Tekere	ticks	most	boxes	on	the	criteria	used	by	Zanu‐PF	to	pick	national	heroes,	helped	
in	 no	 small	 measure	 by	 his	 liberation	 war	 credentials,	 but	 his	 post‐independence	
dalliance	with	opposition	politics	could	be	seen	as	falling	short	of	a	standard	…	that	heroes	
must	have	‘pursued	and	promoted	the	ideals	of	the	liberation	struggle	consistently	and	
persistently,	 without	 deviating	 from	 the	 same,	 right	 through	 to	 the	 bitter	 end’.	
(Newzimbabwe.com,	June	9,	2011)	
	
Clearly	the	principles	on	which	someone	is	declared	a	national	hero	are	not	those	that	the	
war	of	independence	was	fought	for.	According	to	some	online	debates,	the	Tekere	issue	
brings	in	an	ethnic	dimension	(explored	later	in	the	article).	Other	‘heroes’	buried	at	the	
Heroes’	 Acre,	 who	 had	 no	 post‐war	 connection	 with	 ZANU‐PF,	 include	 the	 former	
Commercial	Farmers’	Union	leader	Gary	Magadzire	and	Joseph	Culverwell.	There	is	scant	
scholarship	 on	 these	 issues,	 but	 it	 is	 sufficient	 to	 suggest	 that	 this	 highlights	 the	
problematic	nature	of	ZANU‐PF’s	determination	of	heroes.			
	
Citizen	journalism:	Contesting	Heroes’	Acre	and	heroes	
Narratives	on	the	selection	of	heroes	and	on	the	Heroes’	Acre	as	a	national	space	in	online	
media	and	citizen	journalists’	postings,	explore	issues	which	are	rarely	raised	in	public	
media.	These	include	the	problematics	of	defining	a	hero,	issues	of	ethnicity	and	the	need	
for	 the	 shrine	 to	 be	 inclusive.	 These	 alternative	 voices	 attempt	 to	 upset	 ZANU‐PF’s	
dominant	discourses.	While	the	ruling	party	has	forcefully	harnessed	colonial	memory	
which	tends	to	expediently	privilege	its	position	as	a	nationalist	party	for	the	purpose	of	
nation	 building	 and	 identity	 construction,	 debates	 in	 online	 media	 rail	 against	 this	
(ab)use	 of	 colonial	memory,	 patriotic	 history	 and	 journalism	 (Kriger	 2006;	 Phimister	
2012;	Ranger	2004;	Tendi	2008).	For	example,	in	a	challenge	to	ZANU‐PF’s	dominance	
and	control	over	the	Heroes’	Acre	and	liberation	memory,	Newzimbabwe.com	blogger,	
Chofamba	 Sithole	 (February	15,	 2011),	 argues	 that	 the	 construction	 and	definition	 of	
heroes	can	be	made	by	Zimbabweans	‘apart	from	ZANU‐PF	pronouncements’.		
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Citizens’	definition	of	a	hero	
The	discussion	that	 follows	concerns	contestations	around	the	meanings	attributed	to	
the	national	Heroes’	Acre	as	a	nation‐making	space,	and	offers	alternative	definitions	of	
who/what	a	hero	is.	These	debates	occur	in	a	context	where	ZANU‐PF	has	denied	some	
‘heroes’	burial	at	 the	national	shrine,	while	others	reject,	outright,	burial	at	 the	shrine	
even	prior	to	their	death.	One	of	the	foremost	arguments	regarding	national	heroes	in	
online	discourses	 is	 the	need	to	come	up	with	a	satisfactory,	operative	definition.	The	
MDC	finds	the	current	system	of	hero	selection	as	‘nonsensical	[as]	ZANU‐PF	monopoly	
[carried	out	by	a]	group	of	forsaken	men	and	women	...	[who]	call	themselves	the	ZANU‐
PF	politburo’	(Newzimbabwe.com,	March	8,	2011).	Zimbabweans	have	reacted	to	ZANU‐
PF’s	monopolisation	of	the	national	shrine	by	arguing	that	the	people	need	to	define	what	
a	hero	is,	rather	than	waiting	for	ZANU‐PF	to	decide:		
	
Most	profoundly,	many	Zimbabweans	have	now	come	to	recognise	heroism	apart	from	
ZANU‐PF	pronouncements,	 and	whatever	Mugabe	 and	 his	 Politburo	 say	 of	 those	with	
whom	they	do	not	agree	politically,	if	people	see	them	as	heroes,	then	heroes	they	will	
forever	be.	(Sithole,	NewZimbabwe.com,	February	15,	2011)	
	
Tsitsi	Maguvaz’s	 remarks	 advocate	 for	 an	 inclusive	 and	 fair	 system	 of	 hero	 selection	
under	the	same	blog:		
	
What	qualifies	a	hero	in	Zimbabwe?	Is	there	some	kind	of	criteria	or	a	panel	that	decides	
this?	 If	not	 there	 is	a	need	 for	one	or	 let	 the	people	decide.	A	hero	 is	definitely	 to	 the	
country	and	not	to	the	politicians.	Let	us	not	all	get	 tangled	up	 in	politics	and	give	the	
respect	to	our	heroes.	I	do	not	think	it	is	fair	for	someone	to	deem	a	hero	based	merely	on	
their	personal,	emotional	opinion	or	affiliation.		
	
The	proposition	by	the	opposition	MDC‐T,	for	instance,	is	to	assemble		
	
an	 all‐stakeholders’	 body	with	no	 single	 subjective	 interest	 in	 the	 conferment	 of	 such	
national	status	on	any	individual	...	an	inclusive	national	policy	with	set	parameters	and	
clearly	defined	yardsticks	[to	determine	who	qualifies	to	be	a	national	hero]	...	not	only	
politicians	qualify	to	be	national	heroes	[as]	Zimbabweans	have	produced	the	best	minds	
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in	 business,	 in	 sport,	 in	 music	 and	 in	 the	 arts	 in	 general	 and	 these	 people	 must	 be	
recognised	as	nation	builders.	(MDC	Press	Statement	2009)	
	
The	suggestion	is	that	ZANU‐PF	needs	to	change	the	criteria	for	conferring	hero	status,	
because	observations	by	politicians	and	academics	suggest	that	the	party	uses	the	shrine	
to	selectively	reward	Mugabe	loyalists,	not	necessarily	national	loyalists	(Mpofu	2014a).	
This	 contestation	 emphasises	 that	 the	 process	 needs	 to	 be	 all‐inclusive	 and	 should	
encompass	different	fields	of	achievement.		
In	a	story	‘Zanu‐PF	says	Gamatox	Midzi	deserves	no	honour’,	Newzimbabwe.com	
(June	11,	2015)	reports	on	the	death	of	ZANU‐PF’s	suspended	member	Amos	Midzi,	who	
was	denied	hero	status	by	the	party.	Midzi’s	former	allies,	who	were	sacked	from	ZANU‐
PF,	 include	 Didymus	 Mutasa,	 Rugare	 Gumbo	 and	 then	 Vice‐President	 Joice	 Mujuru,	
among	others.	Mutasa’s	tone	changed	from	his	famous	support	for	the	privatisation	of	the	
shrine	by	ZANU‐PF,	arguing	that	people	have	to	be	accorded	heroes’	status	for	what	they	
contributed	to	Zimbabwe	and	ZANU‐PF,	not	for	daring	to	challenge	Mugabe.		
Umuntu	 comments	 on	 the	 story,	 pointing	 out:	 ‘I	 thought	 that	 place	was	 called	
National	Heroes’	Acre	but	now	 I	 see	 I	was	mistaken.	 It’s	 Zanu	Heroes’	Acre.’	Another	
interlocutor,	Chuck,	responds	thus:			
	
Again	you	are	mistaken:	it’s	a	Mugabe	heroes’	acre.	Midzi	is	still	Zanu‐Pf	member	but	not	
a	 Mugabe	 boot	 licker.	 That’s	 why	 he’s	 no	 hero!	 For	 same	 reason	 Mujuru	 and	 all	 her	
sympathizers	will	never	be	heroes.	By	criticising	Mugabe	they	have	lost	their	rights	to	be	
viewed	as	heroes.	That’s	the	way	the	system	they	set	up	always	perks	and	Gumbo	should	
not	cry	foul.	(Newzimbabwe.com,	June	11,	2015)	
	
This	captures	public	awareness	of	how	ZANU‐PF	operates	in	awarding	hero	status.	It	also	
helps	to	illustrate	the	perceived	security	which	online	media	offer	users,	allowing	them	
to	debate	issues	to	the	extent	of	crossing	political	and	cultural	boundaries	of	correctness,	
e.g.,	by	 ‘insulting’	the	president.	Brad	(Newzimbabwe.com,	June	16,	2015)	summarises	
most	of	the	comments	on	the	story	thus:	‘National	hero	status	has	lost	its	lustre	ever	since	
ZANU‐PF	started	burying	thieves	and	murderers.	We	no	longer	take	it	seriously.’		
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Online	debates	seem	to	suggest	that	anyone	affiliated	to	ZANU‐PF	is	a	villain.	However,	
apparently	 leaving	 ZANU‐PF	 also	 makes	 one	 a	 hero	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 ordinary	 people.	
Mastadon	compares	Midzi	(a	member	of	ZANU‐PF)	to	Mujuru,	Gumbo	and	Mutasa:			
	
The	guy	had	so	much	blood	on	his	hands.	He	did	not	repent,	so	I	hope	he	is	getting	his	true	
Justice	from	the	man	upstairs.	At	least	the	likes	of	Mutasa	and	Mujuru	have	repented	and	
said	 sorry	 for	 their	 transgressions.	We	have	 to	 see	 if	 they	 live	up	 to	 their	new	 image.	
(Newzimbabwe.com,	June	16,	2015)	
	
The	above	suggests	that	like	identity,	hero	status	is	not	fixed	but	changes	according	to	
circumstances.	More	than	three	decades	post‐independence,	ordinary	people’s	definition	
of	a	hero	seems	to	be	mutating:	from	referring	to	those	who	fought	in	the	war,	to	those	
who	are	fighting	the	postcolonial	injustices	perpetrated	by	ZANU‐PF.	In	essence,	online	
public	deliberations	attempt	to	salvage	the	national	memory	and	narrative	from	being	
‘owned’	 by	 ZANU‐PF	 –	 a	 party	 that	 dominates	 the	 grand	 narrative	 of	 the	 liberation	
struggle	–	and	open	up	possibilities	of	participation	on	the	part	of	ordinary	citizens.		
	
Contesting	and	rebuffing	the	notion	of	the	Heroes’	Acre	
ZANU‐PF	has	‘Zanu‐nised’	the	shrine	and	institution	of	Zimbabwean	heroes.	Mugabe	is	
quoted	 by	 Newzimbabwe.com	 (March	 26,	 2011)	 as	 contending	 that	 the	 Heroes’	 Acre	
belongs	to	ZANU‐PF	and	‘only	members	of…	ZANU‐PF	…	will	be	buried	at	the	national	
Heroes’	Acre	 in	Harare	 ...	 those	unhappy	with	 the	development	were	 free	 to	establish	
separate	shrines	for	their	own	heroes’.	This,	to	a	certain	extent,	has	made	the	shrine	fail	
to	arouse	national	pride,	belonging	and	consciousness,	as	it	has	become	a	contested	site	
of	shame	where	crooks,	thieves	and	violent	Mugabe	loyalists	are	buried.	Ultimately,	it	has	
failed	 to	 foster	 the	 national	 unity	 and	 collective	 national	 identity	 for	 which	 it	 was	
intended.	The	use	of	this	space	has	been	contested	since	the	1980s,	first	by	PF‐ZAPU	(the	
main	opposition	until	after	the	Unity	Accord),	then	later	in	the	post‐2000s	by	the	MDC,	
human	rights	NGOs	and	critical	public	intellectuals:	
	
Heroes’	Acre	…	 is	now	a	 true	reflection	not	of	 the	history	of	our	 liberation,	but	of	 the	
betrayal	of	our	Independence	…	it	has	become	a	place	where	those	true	heroes	are	forced	
to	witness	the	destruction	of	what	they	struggled	to	achieve.	ZANU‐PF	has	appropriated	
Heroes’	 Acre,	 turning	 it	 into	 a	 cemetery	 for	 the	 human	 instruments	 of	 murder	 and	
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corruption	 and	 oppression	 through	 which	 they	 have	 stolen	 Zimbabwe	 from	 the	
Zimbabwean	people.	(Sokwanele,	November	21,	2004)	
	
The	Heroes’	 Acre	 is	 not	 only	 a	 contested	 space:	 some	 heroes	 and	 their	 families	 have	
rejected	the	‘honour’	of	having	their	remains	interred	at	the	site,	branding	it	a	space	for	
crooks	and	thieves	with	whom	they	would	not	want	to	be	associated.	While	‘insiders’	to	
the	 country’s	 liberation	war	 and	nation‐making	process	 have	 rejected	 the	 ‘honour’	 of	
being	buried	at	the	shrine,	‘outsiders’/opposition	parties	have	clamoured	for	inclusion,	
both	 in	 terms	 of	 identifying	 heroes	 and	 burial	 at	 the	 shrine	 (particularly	 during	 the	
Government	 of	 National	 Unity	 [GNU]	 period,	 which	 saw	 a	 compromise	 government	
between	ZANU‐PF	and	the	two	MDC	factions	after	the	inconclusive	2008	elections).	 In	
both	instances	ZANU‐PF	retained	power	and	largely	remained	in	charge	of	the	Heroes’	
Acre	and	hero	selection.	
The	trend	is	for	the	opposition	(just	like	PF‐ZAPU	did)	to	request	from	ZANU‐PF	
that	one	of	their	party	members	(or	in	post‐2009	Zimbabwe,	a	GNU‐party	member)	be	
declared	 a	 national	 hero.	 A	 prominent	 example	 is	 that	 of	 Gibson	 Sibanda,	 Deputy	
President	of	MDC	and	a	GNU	cabinet	minister.	When	he	died	in	2010,	both	the	MDC	and	
MDC‐T	approached	ZANU‐PF	to	have	him	declared	a	national	hero.	Their	request	speaks	
to	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	 shrine	 as	 a	 national	 monument	 central	 to	 national	 identity	
formation,	especially	during	the	GNU	when	national	politics	was	polarised	and	prospects	
of	reconciling	political	and	ethnic	tensions	were	thought	to	be	highly	likely.	Briefly,	what	
qualified	Sibanda	as	a	hero	according	is	that	he	was	imprisoned	and	detained	for	three	
years	 for	 his	 role	 in	 the	 liberation	 struggle	 and	 was	 instrumental	 in	 postcolonial	
opposition	politics,	including	the	formation	of	the	GNU	in	2008:	
	
He	was	a	critical	cog	 in	 the	 liberation	struggle	…	 instrumental	 in	creating	 the	ZCTU	…	
played	a	pivotal	role	in	the	formation	of	the	power	sharing	government	…	[and]	kept	true	
to	 his	 principle	 of	 ‘Zimbabwe	 first’	 and	 if	 there’s	 anyone	who	 deserves	 to	 be	 called	 a	
national	hero,	then	it	is	him.	(Newzimbabwe.com,	August	24,	2010)	
	
This	assertion	contests	 the	 limited	definition	of	a	hero	proffered	by	ZANU‐PF.	For	 the	
party,	Sibanda	did	not	qualify	as	a	hero	as	he	had	stood	against	the	liberation	movement’s	
principles	by	forming	and	belonging	to	an	opposition	party.	From	the	quote,	heroes	are	
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not	only	those	who	belong	to	ZANU‐PF	and	fought	in	the	liberation	war,	but	also	those	
who	continually	struggled	for	the	birth	of	a	fair,	just	and	democratic	Zimbabwe,	even	after	
1980.	 In	 response,	 Mugabe’s	 spokesman,	 Charles	 Charamba,	 writing	 under	 the	
pseudonym	Nathaniel	Manheru,	argued	that	the	Heroes’	Acre	is		
	
not	a	facility	for	bleaching	darkened	political	souls.	It	is	a	site	and	recognition	of	honour:	
honour	 irrevocably	 achieved	 and	 thus	 honour	 which	 cannot	 be	 reversed	 or	 undone	
through	subsequent	transgressions.	ZANU‐PF,	the	sole	creator	of	that	Acre	…	sole	author	
of	rules	of	entry	to	that	shrine,	relies	on	death	for	this	irrevocability.	(Newzimbabwe.com,	
August	28,	2010)	
	
Thus	a	‘darkened	soul’	seems	to	be	anyone	who	opposes	and	does	not	belong	to	ZANU‐
PF.	Regardless	of	such	a	person’s	contribution	to	the	fight	against	colonialism	or	tyranny	
in	postcolonial	Zimbabwe,	s/he	cannot	gain	entry	into	the	Heroes’	Acre,	a	space	ZANU‐PF	
has	appropriated	as	its	own.			
In	his	Newzimbabwe.com	column	entitled	 ‘Cry	not	 for	hero	status’	 (August	26,	2010),	
Alex	Magaisa,	former	Chief	of	Staff	in	Tsvangirai’s	office,	makes	a	critical	interjection	that	
seeks	to	neutralise	the	Heroes’	Acre	as	a	pivotal	national	monument.	He	expresses	shock	
that	‘the	MDC	sent	the	petition	at	all	and	secondly,	the	collective	reaction	by	the	two	MDCs	
of	 shock	 and	 disgust	 at	 the	 rejection	 (of	 Sibanda).	 Did	 they	 really	 expect	 anything	
positive?’	(ibid.).	Magaisa	further	dents	the	credibility	and	centrality	of	the	monument	to	
nationhood	by	arguing	 that	 its	elitist	and	privatised	nature	 is	exclusionary,	 sexist	and	
classist:	
	
There	are	only	six	women	buried	at	the	National	Heroes’	Acre	and	all	of	them	except	one	
were	 spouses	 of	 the	 male	 political	 elites.	 The	 other	 one	 recently	 buried	 there	 was	
President’s	 sister.	 Yet	 it	 is	 true	 that	 thousands	 of	 women	 played	 major	 roles	 in	 the	
liberation	 struggle.	 Thousands	 went	 to	 the	 front	 and	 fought	 alongside	 their	 male	
counterparts.	 Thousands	 more	 have	 played	 diverse	 roles	 in	 nation‐building	 since	
independence.	How	can	it	be	that	only	six	of	them	(and	those	six	who	are	connected	to	
male	political	elites)	were	deemed	worthy	of	national	hero	status?	(ibid.)	
	
Magaisa	dismantles	elitist	and	partisan	constructions	of	heroism	and	national	identity	as	
insufficient	 in	 contributing	 to	 the	 construction	 of	 national	 identity	 in	 Zimbabwe.	 The	
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institution	also	acts	in	favour	of	men	‘as	a	black,	male,	political,	party	biased	elitist	project’	
(ibid.)	which,	when	it	decides	to	include	white	people,	are	invariably	male.	To	undermine	
this	system,	Magaisa	suggests	devising	‘novel	ways	of	honouring	citizens’,	perhaps	like	
ZAPU	did	before	the	Unity	Accord.		
Besides	 boycotting	 national	 heroes’	 holidays/burials,	 and	 openly	 criticizing	
ZANU‐PF	 for	 its	 ‘sectarian	 process	 of	 selecting	 heroes’	 (Kriger	 1995,	 151),	 PF‐ZAPU	
established	the	ZIPRA	War	Shrines	Committee	whose	task	was	‘to	locate	the	grave	sites	
of	ZIPRA	freedom	fighters,	both	inside	and	outside	the	country	…	and	marking	them	with	
gravestones	and	building	shrines	that	contain	the	names	of	the	fallen	heroes’	(ibid,	154–
155).	At	the	burial	of	Lookout	Masuku,	Judith	Todd	(2007,	165)	quotes	Joshua	Nkomo	as	
saying:		
	
				 But	they	(ZANU‐PF)	can’t	take	away	his	status	as	a	hero.	You	don’t	give	a	man	the	status	
of	a	hero.	All	you	can	do	is	recognise	it.	It	is	his.	Yes,	he	can	be	forgotten	temporarily	by	
the	state.	But	the	young	people	who	do	research	will	one	day	unveil	what	Lookout	has	
done.		
	
Together	with	opposition	parties,	Zimbabweans	have	undermined	the	ZANU‐PF	method	
of	 identifying	and	honouring	heroes	by	 celebrating	 these	 ‘heroes’	 in	alternative	ways,	
including	through	their	burial	places	and	in	online	media,	regardless	of	the	ruling	party’s	
stance.	Such	online	debates	thus	form	sites	of	protest,	where	competing	narratives	of	the	
nation’s	 alternative	 to	 ZANU‐PF	 are	 produced,	 circulated	 and	 reproduced	 via	 online	
media	(Sumartojo	2012).	For	instance,	at	the	burial	of	Gibson	Sibanda,	Prime	Minister	
Morgan	Tsvangirayi	said:	‘[T]oday	we	are	burying	a	national	hero	whose	works	speak	for	
themselves’	 (Newzimbabwe.com,	 August	 30,	 2010).	 Similarly,	 Moyo	 (2011),	 writing	
about	Lesabe’s	burial,	argues	her	heroine	status	was	attested	to	by	the	number	of	people	
who	turned	up	for	the	funeral	–	something	which	challenges	ZANU‐PF’s	definition	of	a	
hero.	According	to	Sithole	(ibid.),	‘if	[we]	see	them	those	not	chosen	as	heroes	by	ZANU‐
PF	as	heroes,	then	heroes	they	will	forever	be’.	
In	a	Newzimbabwe.com	story,	Norman	Mabhena	is	quoted	as	saying	the	people	do	not	
need	ZANU‐PF	to	declare	anyone	a	hero.	At	the	funeral	of	Welshman	Mabhena,	a	former	
cabinet	minister	and	Governor	of	Matabeleland	South,	his	brother	Norman	said:		
	
 17 
As	a	family,	we	insisted	that	we	would	follow	the	Mabhena	rituals	in	his	burial.	Mabhena	
himself	was	clear	about	this,	he	said	when	he	dies	he	should	not	be	buried	in	Harare.	No	
person	was	going	to	change	that.	We	are	in	our	own	right	veteran	politicians.	We	don’t	
apologise	 for	 that	 and	 whether	 you	 recognise	 it	 or	 not,	 that	 does	 not	 change.	
(Newzimbabwe.com,	October	10,	2010)	
	
According	to	this	report,	hero	status	need	not	be	politicised	or	declared	by	ZANU‐PF	for	
it	 to	 carry	 weight,	 as	 a	 person’s	 life	 and	 contribution	 to	 the	 country	 testify	 to	 their	
heroism.	 Takura	 Zhangazha,	 a	 blogger	 on	 Newzimbabwe.com,	 reiterates	 these	
sentiments:	‘Sibanda	a	hero	wherever	he	is	buried’:	
	
my	firm	conviction	[is]	that	Sibanda	was	a	hero	well	before	he	died;	and	that	he	was	not	
a	 hero	 by	 the	 narrow	 definition	 of	 ZANU‐PF’s	 central	 committee.	 That	 his	 colleagues	
wrote	a	letter	to	President	Mugabe	seeking	to	have	him	interred	at	the	National	Heroes’	
Acre	baffles	the	mind.	This	is	because	that	particular	resting	place	of	most	of	the	leaders	
of	 the	 liberation	struggle	has	been	appropriated	by	 the	ZANU‐PF	cultural	and	political	
hegemonic	project.	To	be	clearer,	the	National	Heroes’	Acre	is	an	institution	that	serves	
the	political	and	power	narratives	of	ZANU‐PF	and	not	the	nation.	(Newzimbabwe.com,	
September	1,	2010)	
	
Thus,	the	burial	space	of	these	three	‘heroes’,	in	this	instance,	does	not	contribute	to	their	
hero	 status,	 while	 their	 works	 and	 the	 respect	 shown	 by	 ordinary	 Zimbabweans	 do.	
Zhangazha	also	undermines	the	national	Heroes’	Acre	as	a	credible	shrine	for	national	
consciousness,	branding	it	a	tainted.	It	 is	a	space	 ‘explicitly	designed	to	impart	certain	
elements	of	the	past	–	and,	by	definition,	to	forget	others’	(Hoelscher	and	Alderman	2004,	
350).	This	contestation	of	space	and	the	national	 identity	narrative	supports	Bhabha’s	
(1990)	assertion	 that	national	 identity	narratives	must	speak	to	 issues	of	multiplicity,	
flexibility	and	hybridity,	not	rigidity	and	exclusivity.	
By	comparison	and	more	problematic	is	the	case	of	Tekere,	whose	‘great	heroic	
deeds	in	his	younger	days	as	a	youth	activist	and	guerrilla	leader	fighting	to	end	white	
rule’.	He	was	awarded	hero	status,	despite	inconsistencies	that	parallel	those	of	Thenjiwe	
Lesabe.	The	fact	that	the	latter	was	denied	the	honour	of	being	buried	in	the	Heroes’	Acre,	
while	 the	 former	 received	 this	 honour,	 is	 contentious	 and	 speaks	 to	 ZANU‐PF’s	
inconsistency	in	honouring	heroes.	
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ZANU‐PF’s	dominant	narrative	on	 the	Heroes’	Acre	as	 the	ultimate	definer	of	a	
hero	and	symbol	of	nationhood	is	challenged	by	Dinizulu	Macaphulana’s	assertion	in	an	
article	 titled,	 ‘On	 the	 heroism	 of	 Gibson	 Sibanda’.	 He	 argues	 that	 it	 ‘shouldn’t	matter	
where	[a	hero’s]	remains	are	interred	—	it	can	be	on	an	anthill,	it	can	be	on	a	mountain,	
on	a	plain	surface	or	in	a	river‐but	that	spot	where	he	is	buried	is	now	a	monument	and	
a	shrine’		(Newzimbabwe.com,	September	3,	2010).		
Monuments	 like	 the	 Heroes’	 Acre	 are	 mythologised	 as	 the	 sole	 ‘Official	 …	
monument	…	[that	plays]	a	unique	role	in	the	creation	of	national	identity	because	[it]	
reflect[s]	how	political	elites	choose	to	represent	the	nation	publicly’	(Forest	and	Johnson	
2002,	256).	This	officialised	and	narrowed‐down	representation	of	national	 identity	is	
undermined	and	dismantled	online	by	ordinary	people.		
Alternative	 versions	 of	 nationhood	 (see	 Mpofu	 2014a,	 2016)	 suggest	 that	
monuments	 like	 the	 Heroes’	 Acre	 and	 national	 holidays	 ‘rather	 than	 being	 sites	 of	
consensus	 building	 ...	 [have]	 become	 contested	 terrains’	which	 are	 not	 passive	 visual	
statements,	but	active	‘elements	in	a	public	discourse	definition’	(Osborne	2001,	17–18).	
These	contestations	have	led	to	definitions	(and	redefinitions)	of	what	it	means	to	be	a	
hero	or	even	a	Zimbabwean.		
	
Ethnicity	and	heroism	
The	 1980s,	 Zimbabwean	 state	 and	 nation	 formation	 was	 hampered	 by	 the	 yet‐to‐be	
addressed	issue	of	tribal	tensions	that	characterised	the	liberation	movement.	Ethnicity	
has	been,	for	a	long	time,	‘not	merely	an	empty	identity	marker	of	identity,	but	a	value‐
laden	political	tool	that	influences	political	life	in	Zimbabwe’	(Mpofu	2013,	116).	Entry	
into	state	power	and	control,	according	to	some	citizens	participating	in	social	and	online	
media	 debates,	 are	 tilted	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 dominant	 Shona	 (who	 are	 characterised	 by	
intra‐ethnic	tensions)	(Mpofu	2014).	Currently,	the	Zimbabwean	national	project	stands	
as	a	‘permanently	stained	…	cloth	of	postcolonial	nationalism	(Worby	1998,	566),	owing	
to	 the	 1980s	 genocide	 which	 claimed	 well	 in	 excess	 of	 20	 0000	 mainly	 isiNdebele‐
speaking	 people,	 who	 were	 seen	 by	 Mugabe	 as	 supporters	 of	 his	 opponent,	 Joshua	
Nkomo.	 This,	 in	 a	 way,	 informs	 myths	 on	 national	 insiders	 (Shona)	 and	 outsiders	
(Ndebele).	Thus,	ethnicity	has	made	national	hero	determination	debates	more	complex.	
There	are	suggestions	in	citizen	journalists’	debates	that	ethnicity	influenced	the	denial	
of	hero	status	to	Lookout	Masuku,	a	former	ZIPRA	military	commander	whom	ZANU‐PF	
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believed	 to	 be	 an	 architect	 of	 the	 dissident	 insurgency	 of	 the	 1980s.	 Joshua	Nkomo’s	
assertion	 that	 ‘political	 and	 ethnic	 grounds’	 (Kriger	 1995,	 153)	 were	 used	 to	 deny	
Masuku	that	status	lends	credence	to	the	argument.	Further,	the	grand	narrative	of	the	
liberation	struggle	privileges	ZANU‐PF	(and	mainly	the	Shona	ethnic	group’s	versions	of	
events)	creating	the	myth	that	Shonas	and	ZANU‐PF	liberated	Zimbabwe.	This	myth	was	
advanced	by	ZANU‐PF	arguing	that	‘during	the	war	…	ZAPU	was	withholding	guerrillas	
from	the	battlefield’	(ibid,	151)	and	post‐independence	withholding	them	from	joining	
the	army,	hence	they	operated	as	dissidents.		
Ake	(1963,	3)	argues	that	in	most	African	countries	nationalism	has	mutated	into	
‘political	ethnicity	when	the	nationalist	movement,	which	was	united	mainly	by	common	
grievances,	 started	 to	 disintegrate	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 independence	 as	 its	 leaders	
manoeuvred	to	inherit	power’.	These	movements	were	characterised	by	ethnic	tensions	
and	a	 lack	of	 intra‐group	cohesion,	as	they	consist	of	 ideologically	opposed	sub‐ethnic	
groups.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 larger	 body	 of	 scholarly	 writing,	 many	 possible	 and	
unconfirmed	interpretations	of	how	ethnicity	informs	national	heroism	are	discussed	in	
online	media.	Even	though	the	veracity	of	some	discussions	cannot	be	ascertained,	it	is	
important	 to	 consider	discourses	 from	ordinary	 citizens	 as	 a	 cognitive	prism	 through	
which	they	discursively	engage	with	one	another	and	with	those	in	power.	
Online	debates	suggest	an	awareness	that	ethnicity	is	one	criteria	that	ZANU‐PF	
allegedly	uses	to	confer	hero	status.	Although	contestable,	a	few	cases	suffice	to	highlight	
arguments	that	validate	this	assertion.	Methuseli	Moyo,	a	revived	ZAPU	spokesman	(now	
with	 Joice	 Mujuru’s	 newly	 formed	 People	 First	 opposition	 party)	 wrote	 in	
Newzimbabwe.com	 (March	 8	 2011)	 after	 the	 death	 of	 Thenjiwe	 Lesabe:	 ‘Lesabe’s	
passing‐on	also	brought	 into	perspective	ZANU‐PF’s	 slide	back	 to	Gukurahundi	mode,	
which	 says	 there	 can	be	no	heroes	 in	 ZAPU,	worse	 if	 they	 are	Ndebele	 like	Thenjiwe	
Lesabe	…		ZANU‐PF	demonstrated	this	through	denying	Lesabe	heroine	status’.	
In	response	to	Methuseli	Moyo’s	opinion	piece,	JJ	(March	8	2011)	wrote	that	the	
selection	of	heroes		
	
is	partisan	and	tribal.	ZAPU	is	the	first	political	party	to	be	brave	enough	to	openly	talk	
about	this	…	[there	is	need	for]	condemning	the	privatizing	of	the	national	heroes	system	
in	Zimbabwe	...	if	you	want	…	guarantee	[of]	being	a	Zimbabwe	national	hero,	you	have	to	
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be	in	no	order;	1‐Shona,	2‐ZANU,	3‐A	thug.	The	most	important	of	these	is	being	a	Shona	
of	course.		
	
The	 line	 of	 argument	 pursued	 here,	 is	 that	 ethnicity	 and	 party	 loyalty	 are	 the	 only	
credentials	used	to	determine	who	can	be	buried	at	the	national	shrine.	Further,	JJ	argues	
that	ZANU‐PF	has	adulterated	the	definition	of	a	hero,	by	basing	it	on	ethnic	lines:		
	
Lesabe	is	not	the	first	national	hero	who	fits	the	criteria	NOT	to	be	a	Zimbabwean	national	
hero.	The	criteria	NOT	to	be	a	national	hero	in	no	specific	order	is	that	1‐You	have	to	be	
part	 of	 ZAPU;	 2‐You	 have	 to	 be	 Ndebele.	 Being	 one	 of	 these	 is	 bad,	 being	 both	
GUARANTEES	 that	 you	 are	 not	 a	 national	 hero.	 There	 are	 countless	 examples	 of	 this;	
Gibson	Sibanda	(ZAPU	&	ndebele),	Lookout	Masuku	(ZAPU	&	Ndebele),	Thenjiwe	Lesabe	
(ZAPU	&	Ndebele)...	The	list	is	too	long.	(ibid.)	
	
JJ	thus	addresses	certain	taboo/sensitive	issues	in	African	politics	–	matters	to	do	with	
ethnicity	are	criminalised	and	rarely	discussed	in	Zimbabwe’s	public	media.	Most	post‐
colonial	 ethnically	 diverse	 countries	 would	 rather	 promote	 national	 identity	 at	 the	
expense	of	ethnic	identity.	Being	ZANU‐PF	is	conflated	with	being	Shona,	by	seemingly	
Ndebele	discussants	like	JJ.	Again,	use	of	words	like	‘you’	has	a	different	meaning	from	
the	way	Tsitsi	Maguvaz	uses	‘our’	‘we’	and	‘us’.	The	‘you’	in	JJ’s	post	is	specific	to	a	Ndebele	
ethnic	in‐group	or	subnational	group.	This	demonstrates	the	fluidity	of	identities	and	the	
tensions	involved	at	different	stages.	Sometimes	ethnic	debates	become	combustive	both	
on‐	 and	 offline,	with	 protestations	 of	 discrimination	 against	Ndebele‐speaking	 people	
and	their	regions.	When	discussed	online,	ethnicity	becomes	a	 touchy	subject,	causing	
discussants	like	bBen	Bown	to	argue	that	some	things	should	not	be	said	because	they	
are	divisive.	In	a	comment	Ben	Bown	states:	
	
@JJ,	Can	you	stop	talking	about	Shona	and	Ndebeles	in	such	different	light	....	these	are	
people	who	are	country	men	and	women.	Jesus!	I	have	looked	at	each	one	of	your	postings	
and	its	all	about	how	bad	the	Shonas	are,	please	spare	us!	Why	not	talk	about	imminent	
issues	 like	 sanctions	 on	 Zimbabwe,	 Tsvangirai,	 Mugabe	 etc	 ...	 that	 is	 less	 divisive.	
(Newzimbabwe.com,	March	8,	2011)	
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Here,	 ben	 bown	 suggests	 that	 ethnic	 particularism	 and	 the	 institutionalisation	 of	
differences	perpetuate	conflict	and	division.	The	appeal	to	speak	about	issues	that	affect	
Zimbabwe,	 rather	 than	 about	 ethnicity,	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 since	 ethnicity	 is	
constructed	 it	 can	 be	 reconstructed	 into	 new	 shared	 ‘consociational	 forms’,	 while	
overlooking	the	extent	of	such	reconstructions	(Nangle	and	Clancy	2012).		
	
CONCLUDING	REMARKS	
From	the	 foregoing	 it	 is	 clear	 that	citizen	 journalism	has	empowered	ordinary	people	
based	both	in	the	homeland	and	the	diaspora	with	a	voice	and	access	to	alternative	public	
spheres	where	they	engage	with	the	media,	those	in	power	and	others.	Such	interactions	
keep	certain	topics	on	the	public	agenda,	since	they	are	of	interest	to	people	in	the	host	
country,	 or	 even	 internationally.	 Citizens’	 participation	 in	 identity	 debates	 by	 using	
alternative	spaces	‘illustrates	that	ordinary	people	have	strong,	long‐standing	opinions	
about	the	future	of	the	nation	and	national	identity	and	will	express	their	opinions	when	
an	outlet	 is	provided	to	them’	(Kaftan	2013,	167).	This	outlet	 is	not	available	to	many	
poor	 Zimbabweans,	 however,	 who	 rely	 on	 radio.	 Moreover,	 contrary	 to	 Appadurai’s	
(1996)	 and	 Hobsbawn’s	 (1990)	 arguments,	 modernity,	 technological	 advances,	
globalisation	and	the	mass	movement	of	people	have	not	undermined	national	affections,	
but	 have	 rather	made	 it	 possible	 for	 people	 to	 participate	 in	 important	 debates.	 This	
assertion	 complements	 global	 scholarship	 which	 abounds	 with	 case	 studies	 on	 how	
technological	developments	(internet	and	its	enabling	technologies)	challenge	the	notion	
that	 the	 territorial	 integrity	of	 a	nation	equals	 cohesive	national	 identity	 (Chan	2005;	
Eriksen	2007;	Everad	2000;	Sheyholislami	2008,	2011).	Instead,	citizen	journalism	and	
participation	in	debates	around	monuments	and	heroes	show	how	new	media	are	used	
as	tools	to	express	the	public’s	ideas	on	the	conflictual	rituals	of	national	identity	making.	
This	article	has	highlighted	 the	problems	associated	with	authoritarian	and	politically	
self‐serving	 narratives	 and	 the	 use	 of	 monuments	 like	 the	 Heroes’	 Acre.	 ZANU‐PF’s	
heightened	and	exclusive	appropriation	of	these	symbols	as	tools	for	political	survival	
came	at	a	time	of	mass	dissent,	sanctions	and	intraparty	friction.	To	maintain	political	
hegemony,	ZANU‐PF	has	used,	among	other	things,	such	monuments	and	recognitions.	
However,	 new	 media	 give	 people	 a	 platform	 to	 deconstruct	 ZANU‐PF’s	 imagined	
nationhood.	Citizen	journalists’	debates	largely	demonstrate	the	‘national	interest’,	while	
ZANU‐PF	advances	a	provincial	and	political	self‐serving	nationalist	agenda	to	ensure	its	
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political	survival,	more	than	anything	else.	Yes,	some	debates	were	supportive	of	ZANU‐
PF’s	constructions	of	identity	in	the	online	media	studied.	It	is	a	weakness	of	this	article	
that,	due	to	space	constraints	and	the	particular	line	of	focus,	those	sentiments	supportive	
of	ZANU‐PF’s	configurations	of	national	identity,	using	the	Heroes’	Acre	and	heroes,	could	
not	be	entertained.		
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